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DEFINING "DISABILITY" UNDER THE MAINE 
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT AFTER WHITNEY V. WAL-
MART STORES, INC. 
Michael Anderson· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,1 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting 
as the Law Court, was asked to determine whether the Maine Human Rights Act2 
(MHRA) requires plaintiffs alleging disability discrimination to show that their 
condition substantially limits one or more major life activities. 3 In determining that the 
MHRA does not require such a showing, the court effectively established that the 
MHRA was intended to protect a much broader range of medical conditions than its 
federal counterparts, the Rehabilitation Act of 19734 (Rehabilitation Act) and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 19905 (ADA).6 In so doing, the Whitney court 
invalidated a regulation adopted by the Maine Human Rights Commission that had 
been in place for nearly twenty years. 7 The primary reasoning articulated by the 
majority in reaching this decision was that the statutory definition of disability within 
the MHRA is unambiguous and, by its own terms, includes no qualification of 
substantiality. 8 Two dissents found ambiguity within the statute and called for 
deference to the Commission's regulation. 9 
This Note considers the history of the MHRA and its construction in both state and 
federal courts since its promulgation. It looks to the adoption of the Maine Human 
Rights Commission regulation as a valid and reasonable interpretation of the MRHA 
and briefly explores the rationale underlying that interpretation. Additionally, it 
examines the rules of statutory construction practiced by Maine courts and identifies 
the appropriate deference granted to administrative regulations during the course of 
such construction. This Note concludes that the Law Court erred when it neglected to 
recognize the ambiguity within the MHRA's definition of"disability," and thus failed 
to give the proper deference to the Commission's interpretation of the statute. 
Furthermore, this Note argues that, by declaring the regulation void on account of the 
overwhelming clarity of the statute, the Whitney court stripped employers, 
practitioners, and courts of any true guidance on what constitutes a disability under 
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Maine School of Law. 
I. 2006 ME 37, 895 A.2d 309. 
2. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §§ 4551-4634 (West 2005). 
3. Whitney, 2006 ME 37, iJ I, 895 A.2d 309 at 310. 
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (2000). 
5. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
6. Whitney, 2006 ME 37, iJ 31, 895 A.2d at 316. 
7. Id. ,i 33, 895 A.2d at 316 (invalidating Me. Human Rights Comm'n II CMR 94 348 003-2 § 
3.02(C)(l) (1999)). 
8. Id. ,I 28, 895 A.2d at 316. 
9. Id. iJiJ 41, 49,895 A.2d at 318,319. 
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Maine law, invalidating years of precedent in the process. Finally, this Note 
recommends that the Maine Legislature address this lack of guidance by clarifying the 
statutory definition of disability under the MHRA. 
II. THE MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 
A. Statutory History 
The MHRA was enacted in 1971 "to prevent discrimination in employment, 
housing or access to public accommodations on account of race, color, religion, 
ancestry or national origin." 10 In its original form, the MHRA did not protect against 
discrimination on the basis of physical or mental disability. In 1973, Congress passed 
the Rehabilitation Act, 11 which made it unlawful for any federally funded program to 
discriminate against any "otherwise qualified handicapped individual." 12 That same 
year, "physical handicap" was added as an impermissible basis for discrimination 
under the MHRA. 13 In 1975, the Maine Legislature added "mental handicap" to the 
MHRA 14 and included a definition of "physical or mental handicap." 15 While the 
Rehabilitation Act defined a "handicapped individual" as a person who "has a physical 
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more ... major life activities," 16 
the MHRA definition stated that: 
"Physical or mental handicap" means any disability, infirmity, malformation, 
disfigurement, congenital defect or mental condition caused by bodily injury, 
accident, disease, birth defect, environmental conditions or illness; and also includes 
the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap 
as determined by a physician or, in the case of mental handicap, by a psychiatrist or 
psychologist, as well as any other health or sensory impairment which requires special 
education, vocational rehabilitation or related services.17 
The original drafting of the MHRA definition included a non-exclusive list of 
examples of"physical or mental handicap," stating that the term "shall include, but is 
not limited to: epilepsy seizure disorders; any degree of paralysis; cerebral palsy, 
autism; mental retardation; amputation; lack of physical function or coordination; 
impairment of sight, hearing or speech; or physical reliance on a seeing eye dog, 
wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device." 18 The drafting committee struck 
this language, however, explaining that "[i]t ... felt unnecessary to spell out some of 
the conditions and not all ofthem." 19 
10. P.L. 1971, ch. 501, § I (amended 1973). 
11. An Act to Replace the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). 
12. Id. § 504. 
13. P.L. 1973, ch. 705, § I (amended 1975). No definition of"physical handicap" was included within 
the MHRA at this time. Id. 
14. P.L. 1975, ch. 358, § I (amended 1991). 
15. Id. § 2. 
16. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § l l l(A), 88 Stat. 1617 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(8) (2000)). 
17. P.L. 1975, ch. 358, § 2 (amended 1991). 
18. L.D. 1791, § 2 (107th Legis. 1975). 
19. Comm. Amendment A to L.D. 1791, No. H-351 (107th Legis. 1975). 
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In 1990, Congress passed the ADA, 20 which prohibits, inter a/ia, certain private 
employers 21 from discriminating on the basis of disability with respect to "job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment." 22 The ADA definition of disability is virtually identical to that of the 
Rehabilitation Act, specifically indicating that a disability means "a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual." 23 Despite the ADA's definition of"disability," the Maine Legislature did 
not incorporate it into the MHRA. In fact, the MHRA definition of"physical or mental 
handicap" was amended only once, in 1991,24 not to make substantive changes to the 
provision itself but rather to replace the word "handicap" with "disability." 25 
The importance of identifying the scope of the MHRA's definition of"physical 
or mental disability'' becomes clear in light of the procedure required for proving a 
claim under the statute. The MHRA establishes that an individual seeking relief for 
unlawful discrimination must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the 
alleged unlawful discrimination occurred. 26 In Maine Human Rights Commission v. 
City of Auburn,2 7 the Law Court adopted the three-step, burden-shifting analysis set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 28 as 
a means of evaluating employment discrimination claims at the summary judgment 
stage. 29 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, as applied by the court, a plaintiff 
employee asserting disability discrimination must initially make out aprimafacie case 
by proving that "first, she suffers from a [physical or mental] disability; second, she is 
otherwise qualified, with or without reasonable accommodations, and is able to 
perform the essential functions of the job; and third, she was adversely treated by the 
employer based in whole or in part on her disability." 30 The burden then shifts to the 
employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the adverse action. 31 
If such a basis is shown, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the 
claimed legitimate reason is mere pretext. 32 
20. An Act to Establish a Clear and Comprehensive Prohibition of Discrimination on the Basis of 
Disability, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 {1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)). 
21. The employment provisions generally apply to employers with fifteen or more employees. 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000). 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). 
24. P.L. 1991, ch. 99, § 2. 
25. See L.D. 191, Statement of Fact (I 15th Legis. 1991) ("This bill does not change the substance of 
the Maine Human Rights Act, but changes the terminology from handicap to disability."). This amendment 
also replaced the semicolon after the word "illness," eliminated the word "also" and twice replaced the word 
"which" with "that." Id. § 2. 
26. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4631 (West 2005). 
27. 408 A.2d 1253 (Me. I 979). 
28. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
29. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1261-62. 
30. Doyle v. Dep't of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ,r 14,824 A.2d 48, 54. 
31. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at I 262. For a discussion of affirmative defenses prescribed by the 
MHRA, see infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
32. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1262. 
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Thus, as an initial matter, a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination under the 
MHRA must first demonstrate that he or she has a "physical or mental disability." 
Although such a showing is only one of several hurdles a plaintiff must overcome in 
bringing a successful claim, its importance cannot be overstated. In this context, the 
consequences of determining the scope of the statutory definition become clear: the 
broader the reading, the more citizens statutorily defined as "disabled," and thus the 
greater the likelihood of a claimant moving beyond summary judgment. 
B. The Maine Human Rights Commission's Interpretation of "Disability" 
Upon enacting the MHRA, the Legislature also established the Maine Human 
Rights Commission, which was given "the duty of investigating all conditions and 
practices within the State which allegedly detract from the enjoyment, by each 
inhabitant of the State, of full human rights and personal dignity." 33 Among the powers 
and duties granted by the Legislature to the Commission is the power to "adopt, amend 
and rescind rules and regulations to effectuate this Act" and to do "everything 
reasonably necessary to perform its duties under this Act." 34 Pursuant to this duty, the 
Commission adopted the Employment Regulations of the Maine Human Rights 
Commission, 35 which were intended to "inform employers, labor organizations, 
employment agencies, and other interested parties of the Commission's interpretation 
of the Maine Human Rights Act." 36 Included within these regulations was the agency's 
definition of "physical or mental disability": 
An applicant or employee who has a "physical or mental disability" means any person 
who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of 
such person's major life activities, has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as 
having such an impairment. 37 
This regulation effectively adopted the definition of physical and mental disability 
utilized by both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 38 An internal memorandum of 
the Commission indicates that this language was proposed and adopted in response to 
the overly broad language of the MHRA.39 In a written statement prepared following 
33. P.L. 1971, ch. 501, § I (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §§ 4551-4634 (West 
2005)). 
34. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4566(7), (12) (West 2005). The Commission also has the duty of 
investigating claims of discrimination made by either "public agencies" or "private persons," hold hearings 
and take testimony, issue subpoenas, create "local or statewide advisory agencies," report to the Legislature 
and Governor at least once a year describing their activities and to make recommendations "for further 
legislation or executive action." Id. § 4566. 
35. Me. Human Rights Comm'n 11 CMR 94 348. 
36. Id. § 3.0l(A). 
37. Id.§ 3.02(C)(I). 
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2000) (Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (2000) (ADA). 
See also supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text. 
39. Memorandum of John E. Carnes, Counsel, Maine Human Rights Commission (Sept. 19, 1984). 
The memo indicates that"[ d]uring the past couple of years, Human Rights Commissioners, stafl1members, 
and several legislators have expressed concern that the statutory reference to 'any disability ... caused by 
bodily injury, accident, disease ... or illness,' is so broad and general that it could be interpreted to include 
conditions which are not serious and of only temporary duration." Id. at 2. 
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a public hearing on the regulation, the Commission indicated that the definition was 
an "effort to clarify its interpretation of the phrase 'physical or mental handicap' as 
referring to serious impairments of more than temporary duration." 40 
C. Judicial Interpretation of "Disability" 
Prior to the Whitney decision, the Law Court had considered the scope of the 
MHRA definition of"disability" several times, either directly or indirectly. In Maine 
Human Rights Commission v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.,41 the court considered the appeal 
of a decision by the Superior Court dismissing certain railroad employees' complaints 
of unlawful disability discrimination under the MHRA. 42 One employee had been fired 
based on the employer's concern that his asymptomatic heart murmur could lead to a 
risk of sudden heart failure. 43 The defendant employer did not argue that the 
employee's condition failed to meet the statutory definition of "physical or mental 
handicap" under the MHRA, 44 but rather relied on several affirmative defenses that, 
if successful, would have rendered the termination non-discriminatory. 45 As a result, 
the court did not expressly consider on appeal whether or not the asymptomatic condi-
tion constituted a physical handicap under the statute.46 In rejecting the employer's 
affirmative defenses, however, the court stated that, as a result of the employee's 
"diagnosed handicap," his termination was discriminatory under the MHRA. 47 
Three years later, in Rozanski v. A-P-A Transport, Inc., 48 a defendant trucking 
company appealed a ruling from the Superior Court that two of its former employees 
were "handicapped" under the MHRA. 49 Both employees had been fired after physical 
examinations, taken as a condition of their employment, revealed latent lower back 
defects. 50 The court held that the employees' defects "fit within the express terms of 
[the MHRA's definition of physical or mental disability] since the asymptomatic 
condition of each of the men constitutes a 'malformation' of the spine" and concluded 
that their "latent back conditions, which were the sole ground for their termination, are 
40. Comments and Responses to Comments on Proposed Rule Defining "Physical or Mental 
Handicap," Maine Human Rights Commission (Mar. 8, 1985). 
41. 458 A.2d 1225 (Me. 1983). 
42. Id. at 1227. 
43. Id. at 1229. 
44. This case was decided prior to the amendment to the MHRA changing the applicable language from 
"handicap" to "disability." See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
45. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 458 A.2d at 1227. Specifically, the employer relied on two statutorily 
defined exceptions to demonstrate that the discrimination was not unlawful. Id. at 1230. The first such 
exception, know as the "BFOQ" defense, allows such discrimination when based on a "bona fide 
occupational qualification." Id. (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4572(1)(West2005)). The second 
affirmative defense, the "safety" defense, is applicable when an employee's disability renders him unable 
to perform his or her duties "in a manner which would not endanger the health or safety of others." Id. 
(quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4573(4) (West 2005)). 
46. The court mentioned only briefly the requirement of establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination and proceeded directly to the employer's affirmative defenses. Id. The statutory definition 
of"mental or physical handicap" is not discussed in the opinion. 
47. Id. at 1235. 
48. 512 A.2d 335 (Me. 1986). 
49. Id. at 338. 
50. Id. 
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physical handicaps that entitle them to the protection of the [MHRA ]. "51 Rozanski was 
decided one year following the promulgation of the Commission's definition of 
"physical or mental handicap," but did not address the regulation in its decision and 
did not speak directly to the validity of the "substantially limits" requirement. 52 
Finally, in Winston v. Maine Technical College System, 53 the court held that a 
sexual behavior disorder was not a protected disability under the MHRA. 54 The 
plaintiff in Winston was an instructor at a community college who was dismissed for 
violating the school's sexual harassment policy by kissing one of his students. 55 
Following the termination, the instructor filed suit under the MHRA, claiming that he 
was fired based on his "mental handicap of sexual addiction." 56 Two experts 
diagnosed the instructor's sexual addiction as a permanent disorder under the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and stated that the 
condition led to the termination. 57 A third expert testified that the DSM was not 
applicable to sexual behavior but, in any event, the instructor's behavior was 
controllable and not compulsive. 58 The Superior Court granted summary judgment to 
the school on all claims, holding that the claimed disability did not bring the instructor 
under the protection of the MHRA. 59 
The Law Court affirmed in a unanimous decision, and in addressing whether a 
"sexual control impulse disorder" constituted a legal disability under the MHRA, Chief 
Justice Wathen wrote that "[t]he provisions of the MHRA regarding mental disability 
are very similar to those contained in the [Rehabilitation] Act. "60 The court cited both 
the MHRA definition of "physical and mental disability" and the corresponding 
regulation, noting that the Commission had "supplemented" the statutory definition. 61 
Based on the similarities between the federal and state statutory schemes, the court 
stated that "because the MHRA generally tracks federal anti-discrimination statutes, 
it is appropriate to look to federal precedent for guidance in interpreting the MHRA"62 
but found that "a review of federal case laws concerning conditions that constitute a 
disability provides minimal guidance in determining when it is appropriate to impose 
categorical limits on the definition of a disabled individual." 63 Citing to specific 
language within the Rehabilitation Act, the Chief Justice concluded that "[b ]ecause the 
51. Id. at 340. At the time of the Rozanski decision, the MHRA included within its definition of 
"physical or mental handicap" any "disability, infirmity, malformation, disfigurement, congenital defect 
or mental condition caused by bodily injury, accident, disease, birth defect, environmental conditions or 
illness." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4553(7-A)(1979)(emphasis added). The term "handicap" was later 
amended to read "disability." P.L. 1991, ch. 99, § 2. 
52. See generally Rozanski, 512 A.2d 335. 
53. 631 A.2d 70 (Me. 1993). 
54. Id. at 72. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 73. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 74. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 74-75 ( citing Maine Human Rights Comm 'n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 
1979)). 
63. Id. at 75. 
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MHRA was modeled after the [Rehabilitation] Act, and the Act was not intended to 
protect individuals with sexual behavior disorders, we conclude that plaintiff's 
condition is not protected under the MHRA as a matter oflaw.''64 
The Law Court in Winston not only recognized the Commission's regulation as a 
valid supplement to the MHRA, 65 but it reinforced the propriety of looking to federal 
precedent when interpreting the Act, specifically regarding the scope of the term 
"disability." 66 Such reasoning has informed the decisions of the overwhelming 
majority offederal and state courts confronted with interpreting the MHRA. 67 These 
courts have, as in Winston, looked beyond the wording of the MHRA in analyzing 
claims brought under the statute and found guidance in both federal law and the 
regulations promulgated by the Commission. 
D. Rules of Statutory Construction 
When interpreting statutory language, Maine courts utilize a two-step process. 
The threshold inquiry is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction known as the 
64. Id. 
65. See id. at 7 4. In addition to quoting the Commission's definition of"physical or mental handicap," 
the court also noted, inter alia, that the regulations included "emotional illness" within the definition of 
"mental impairment," and "working" within the definition of"major life activities." Id. 
66. See id. at 74-75. 
67. See, e.g. Bilodeau v. Mega Industries, 50 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D. Me. 1999). In Bilodeau, the court 
rejected a plaintiff's contention that the MHRA provided broader coverage than the ADA. Id. at 32 n.2. 
Noting that "[n]o other court considering claims under both the ADA and the MHRA has conducted the 
analysis of whether an individual is disabled separately," the court pointed to the fact that the Law Court 
recognized the Commission's regulation in Winston and subsequently applied the same analysis to both the 
ADA and MHRA claims in terms of what constituted a disability. Id. See also Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. 
Co., 333 F.3d 299,312 (1st Cir. 2003) ("It is settled law that the MHRA should be construed and applied 
along the same contours as the ADA."); Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 50 n.l (1st Cir. 2001) (utilizing 
identical standards in analyzing a claim brought under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act and the MHRA); 
Pouliot v. Town of Fairfield, 226 F. Supp. 2d 233, 244 (D. Me. 2002) (holding that because the same 
analysis applies to both ADA and MHRA, a failure by a plaintiff to show a substantial limitation on a major 
life activity precluded employment discrimination claims under both statutes); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., 
Inc., 928 F. Supp. 37, 45 (D. Me. 1996) ("In analyzing the ADA and MHRA, the Court need not 
continuously distinguish between the two statutes as to their scope and general intent because Maine courts 
consistently look to federal law in interpreting state anti-discriminatory statutes."); Me. Human Rights 
Comm'n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d at 1261 ("In enacting the Human Rights Act, Maine was legislating 
against the background of prior federal antidiscrimination statutes ... and a developing body of case law 
construing and applying those statutes .... [T]he Maine legislature- by adopting provisions that generally 
track the federal antidiscrimination statutes-intended the courts to look to the federal case law to 'provide 
significant guidance in the construction of our statute."' ( quoting Me. Human Rights Comm'n v. Local 
1361, 383 A.2d 369,375 (Me. 1978))); Doyle v. Me. Dep't of Human Servs., No. Civ.A. CV-00-239, 2002 
WL 1978907, at *4-*6 (Me. Super. Ct., July 10, 2002) (Marden, J.) (finding that plaintiff with substantial 
portion of her colon removed and who was forced to use a pouch to eliminate waste clearly suffered from 
a physical impairment but was not "disabled" under the MHRA because she did not meet the requirement 
ofa substantial limitation ofa major life activity as set forth in the Commission's regulations); Murphy v. 
C.N. Brown, Co., No. CV-01-5, 2002 WL 748892, at *2 (Me. Super. Ct., Mar. 22, 2002) (Mead, J.) 
(recognizing regulatory requirement of substantiality and questioning whether plaintiff's hearing 
impairment metthat standard). But see Norton v. Lakeside Family Practice, P.A., 382 F. Supp. 2d 202,205 
n.2 (D. Me. 2005) (noting that the MHRA "has a broader definition of 'physical or mental disability"' than 
the Rehabilitation Act). 
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"plain meaning" rule: if the meaning of the language is plain, the court must interpret 
the statute to mean exactly what it says.68 As a matter of policy, "when the language 
chosen by the Legislature is clear and without ambiguity, it is not the role of the court 
to look behind those clear words in order to ascertain what the court may conclude was 
the Legislature's intent." 69 Such a finding of statutory clarity ends the inquiry. 70 In 
searching for a plain meaning, "[t]he statutory scheme from which the language arises 
must be interpreted to achieve a harmonious outcome" and the court "will not construe 
statutory language to effect absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results." 71 
If the statutory language is ambiguous, however, the court will "look beyond it to 
the legislative history or other external indicia of legislative intent." 72 Ambiguous 
language is defined as language that is "reasonably susceptible of different 
interpretations." 73 In looking beyond the language of the statute, Maine courts have 
granted significant deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute that it 
administers when that interpretation "is both reasonable and within the agency's own 
expertise." 74 Indeed, the Law Court, in specifically addressing the Maine Human 
Rights Commission regulations, indicated that"[ a ]dministrative interpretations by our 
Commission ... are entitled to great deference, especially where that interpretation 
involves a reasonably 'contemporaneous construction ofa statute by the men charged 
with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion. "' 75 
III. THE WHITNEYDECISION 
A. Factual Background 
Stanley Whitney was hired by Wal-Mart in 1998 at one of its store locations in 
Florida. 76 In 2001, Whitney accepted a salaried position in North Windham, Maine, 
as tire-lube express department manager, where he worked an average of six days and 
over seventy hours per week. 77 Soon thereafter, Whitney was diagnosed with high 
blood pressure and possible heart disease, for which he was granted a two-month leave 
68. See Kimball v. Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 2000 ME 20, ,i 18, 745 A.2d 387,392. 
69. Id. 
70. Botting v. Dep'tofBehavioral & Developmental Servs., 2003 ME 152, ,i 10,838A.2d1168, 1171 
("If the plain meaning of the statute is clear, we need investigate no further."). 
71. Coker v. City of Lewiston, 1998 ME 93, ,i 7, 710 A.2d 909,910. 
72. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd. v. State Tax Assessor, 2005 ME 96, ,i 8, 879 A.2d 15, 18. 
73. Competitive Energy Servs. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 2003 ME 12, ,i 15, 818 A.2d 1039, 1046 
(quoting Portland Valve, Inc. v. Rockwood Sys. Corp., 460 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Me. 1983)). 
74. Botting, 2003 ME 152, ,I 9,838 A.2d at 1171. See also Competitive Energy, 2003 ME 12, ,I 15, 
818 A.2d at 1046 (holding that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes are "reviewed only to 
'determine whether the agency's conclusions are unreasonable, unjust or unlawful in light of the record."' 
(quoting Guilford Transp. Indus. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 2000 ME 31, ,i 6, 746 A.2d 910, 912)); 
Conservation Land Found. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, ,i 23, 823 A.2d 55 I, 559 ("[l]f the 
Legislature's intent is not expressed unambiguously and the interpretation of the statutory scheme involves 
issues that are within the scope of the agency's expertise, then the agency's interpretation must be given 
special deference."). 
75. Me. Human Rights Comm'n v. Local 1361, 383 A.2d 369,378 (Me. 1978) (quoting Norwegian 
Nitrogen Prods. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294,315 (1933)) (citations omitted). 
76. Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37, ,i 2, 895 A.2d 309, 310. 
77. Id. 
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of absence so that further tests could be performed. 78 Whitney returned to work with 
a note from his physician's assistant indicating that he should not, as a result of his 
condition, be allowed to work more than eight hours per day and forty hours per week 
with two consecutive days off, a request he later amended to nine hours per day with 
two consecutive days off and no more than forty-five hours per week.79 
Whitney's supervisors informed him that the minimum hours expected of his 
position as tire-lube manager were forty-eight to fifty-two hours per week, and that if 
he could not meet those requirements he would have to transfer to another non-salaried 
department manager position that would accommodate his requested reduction in 
hours. 80 After applying unsuccessfully for several of these positions, Whitney accepted 
a job as a non-salaried department manager in a Wal-Mart store in Scarborough, 
Maine.81 
B. Procedural Background 
In January of 2004, Whitney filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging disability 
discrimination by Wal-Mart in violation of the MHRA. 82 He sought injunctive relief 
in the form of reinstatement as tire-lube express manager at the North Windham 
location as well as damages. 83 Wal-Mart, asserting diversity of citizenship, removed 
the case to the United States District Court for the District ofMaine. 84 
Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Whitney's heart 
condition did not meet the statutory definition of a disability. 85 A federal magistrate 
judge issued a recommended decision that the motion be granted as to all counts. 86 
The magistrate based her decision on the disability claim on the fact that the MHRA, 
like the ADA, required a showing of a "substantial limitation in a major life activity" 
in order to prove that the claimant was disabled under the terms of the statute. 87 The 
78. Id. 'II 3, 895 A.2d at 310-11. According to the affidavit of the cardiologist who was treating Mr. 
Whitney at the time, these tests revealed ''the presence of coronary heart disease." Affidavit of Joseph N. 
Wight, Jr., M.D. at I, Whitneyv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Me. 2005) (No. Civ. 04-
38-P-H). 
79. Whitney, 2006 ME 37, 'I! 3,895 A.2d at 311. 
80. Id. 'II 4, 895 A.2d at 311. 
81. Id. Prior to accepting the job in Scarborough, Whitney had informed his supervisors through his 
attorney that he felt he had been "forced out of his job as TLE Manager in violation of laws forbidding 
discrimination against persons with disabilities." Whitney, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 326. In addition, he had 
asked, in a letter to a supervisor, to remain in his position under the reduced hours, asserting that "TLE 
managers can, with few exceptions, complete their job duties in 40-45 hours per week." Id. 
82. Whitney, 2006 ME 37, 'I! 5, 895 A.2d at 3 I I. Whitney also alleged age discrimination and breach 
of his employment contract. Id. Those claims were not implicated by the questions certified to the Law 
Court and are not relevant to the subject matter of this Note. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 'II 6, 895 A.2d at 3 I I. 
86. Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. 04-38-P-H, 2004 WL 2792297, at *I (D. Me. Dec. 3, 
2004). 
87. Id. at *6. The Magistrate, while conceding that the MHRA had a "curious jurisprudential history," 
asserted that "if there is anything consistent about its application in this court, and in the courts of Maine, 
it is that the MHRA will be construed consistently with the ADA," compelling an analysis of Whitney's 
claim under the MHRA "in a manner consistent with how that claim would be analyzed under the ADA." 
Id. at *8. 
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Magistrate concluded that while Whitney had established that he had a "physical 
impairment" that limited him to forty-five hours of work a week, such a restriction 
"[did] not amount to a substantial limitation." 88 Rather than accepting the 
recommended decision, the district court certified two questions for interpretation by 
the Law Court. 89 These questions, as stated by the district court, were: 
I. Does the Maine Human Rights Act definition of"physical or mental disability" 
found at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(7-A) require a showing ofa substantial limitation 
on a major life activity as does its federal analogue, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)? 
2. Is Section 3.02(C) of the regulations adopted by the Maine Human Rights 
Commission, defining a "physical or mental impairment," invalid because it 
requires a showing of a substantial limitation on a major life activity?90 
C. Arguments on the Certified Question 
Whitney made several arguments that his heart condition was indeed a disability 
under the MHRA and that the Commission's regulation was void. First, he asserted 
that although both federal and state courts had looked to the ADA as a means of 
interpreting the MHRA, such an endeavor is only appropriate "when the language of 
the Maine and federal statutes being construed is identical or virtually so. "91 Whitney 
argued that, unlike the ADA, the MHRA contained no requirement of a substantial 
limitation on a major life activity, and thus "reliance on judicial quotations endorsing 
parallel construction of the statutes is therefore completely misplaced." 92 
In addition, Whitney called attention to both the Rozanski and Canadian Pacific 
decisions, arguing that the Law Court had in both cases considered the scope of the 
definition of disability under the MHRA and had reached results inconsistent with the 
ADA 93 He asserted that because these previous interpretations of the MHRA by the 
court departed from the ADA on the definition of disability, the statute clearly did not 
require a showing that the disability "substantially limits one or more of such person's 
major life activities." 94 Specifically, Whitney argued that in both cases the plaintiffs 
had asymptomatic conditions of which they were unaware and were thus obviously 
"not limited in performing a major life activity." 95 
Whitney also pointed to two significant occasions when the Maine Legislature 
passed on an opportunity to adopt a more stringent definition of disability that would 
parallel federal law. 96 In the first instance, the Legislature amended the MHRA to 
include a definition for "physical or mental handicap" 97 choosing not to include the 
88. Id. at *8. 
89. Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 323, 327 (D. Me. 2005). 
90. Id. 
91. Brief for Plaintiff at 4, Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37, 895 A.2d 309 (No. Fed. 
05-172) (citing Me. Human Rights Comm'n v. Local 1361, 383 A.2d 369,375 (Me. 1978) ("[D]ecisions 
by federal courts interpreting the federal statutory equivalents of the Maine Act provide significant 
guidance in the construction of our statute.") (emphasis added)). 
92. Id. at 4. 
93. Id. at 4-5. 
94. Id. at 7. 
95. Id. at 5-6, 6 n.5. 
96. Id. at6-7. 
97. P.L. 1975, ch. 358, § I. 
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"substantially limits" language adopted by the Rehabilitation Act.98 Similarly, Whitney 
pointed to the 1991 amendment to the definition of"physical disability" 99 where, again, 
the Legislature failed to adopt the "substantially limits" requirement that had since 
been implemented in the ADA. 100 He asserted that, based on these instances, "it would 
represent an encroachment on the powers of the legislature for this court to read into 
the statute restrictive language which the legislature itself has repeatedly declined to 
enact." 101 
Finally, Whitney argued that the regulation adopted by the Commission, 102 which 
incorporated the federal substantiality requirement, was void. 103 He asserted that 
deference granted to administrative agencies is lessened when the agency in question 
is merely offering an interpretation of a statute as opposed to exercising rule making 
authority as prescribed by the legislature. 104 Whitney further contended that the 
Commission was not empowered to "interpret" the MHRA by adopting restrictive 
regulations that directly contradict the clear wording of the statute. 105 
In response, Wal-Mart argued that the MHRA definition of"physical or mental 
disability" did in fact require a showing of a substantial limitation on a major life 
activity, consistent with federal law. 106 First, Wal-Mart asserted that because the 
MHRA's definition of "physical or mental disability" includes "the physical ... 
condition of a person that constitutes a substantial disability as determined by a 
physician," a requirement of substantiality must be applied to the entire definition. 107 
Wal-Mart argued that any other reading would create a situation in which those 
employees who sought a determination from a physician would need to prove that their 
disabilities were substantial while all others would not. 108 Wal-Mart asserted that such 
a result was illogical and, at the very least, that this "apparent inconsistency creates an 
ambiguity within the statute." 109 Based on that ambiguity, Wal-Mart concluded that 
deference to the Commission's interpretation of the statue was proper "as long as the 
agency's construction is reasonable." 110 
Turning to the regulation itself, Wal-Mart noted that the Commission had the 
statutory authority to implement the MHRA, 111 and, in adopting the more restrictive 
98. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text. 
99. P.L.1991,ch.99,§2. 
I 00. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
10 I. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 91, at 7. 
102. Me. Human Rights Comm'n 11 CMR 94 348 003-2 § 3.02(C)(l) (1999). 
103. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 91, at 12-14. 
104. Id. at 12 n.14 (citing U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 213,232 (2001)). The regulations expressly 
indicate that they are "the Commission's interpretation of the Maine Human Rights Act." Me. Human 
Rights Comm'n 11 CMR 94 348 003-1 § 3.0l(A) (1999). 
105. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 91, at 12 (citing Joyce v. Webber, 157 Me. 234,238, 170 A.2d 705, 
708 (1957)). 
106. Brief for Defendant, Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37,895 A.2d 309 (No. Fed. 05-
172). 
107. Id. at 10-11 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 4553(7-A) (2002) (emphasis added)). 
108. Id. at I I. 
I 09. Id. 
I 10. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 2003 ME 62, 
, 23, 823 A.2d 551, 559). 
111. Id. at 16 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4566 (West 2005)). 
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definition of disability, was simply attempting to reflect legislative intent that the 
statute provide relief to "those individuals affected by substantial physical infirmities 
as opposed to those experiencing temporary or insignificant impairments." 112 Wal-
Mart further asserted that failure by the Legislature to amend or clarify the statute at 
any time following the enactment of the regulation represented acquiescence rather 
than rejection of the Commission's definition. 113 Finally, Wal-Mart argued that the 
regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the statute in light of the "practical 
impact" of the construction set forth by the plaintiff. 114 Specifically, Wal-Mart 
contended that under such a reading, "the vast majority of individuals would belong 
to the protected class" and that the MHRA ''was not designed to afford protection to 
every individual who might experience some level of mental or physical infirmity." 115 
D. The Decision of the Law Court 
A majority of the Law Court rejected Wal-Mart's assertion that the MHRA 
required a showing of a "substantial limitation on a major life activity," thereby 
invalidating the Commission regulation. 116 The majority stated that the two relevant 
amendments to the MHRA definition of "physical or mental impairment" without 
incorporation of the federal standard were "strongly probative oflegislative rejection, 
not adoption, of the restrictive language." 117 In dismissing Wal-Mart's argument of 
legislative acquiescence, the court held that "[n]othing in the legislative history, or 
anywhere else, supports that view." 118 The majority stated that its decision in Rozanski 
instructed "that 'latent' conditions are protected under the [MHRA] definition," a 
holding that "necessarily rejects the 'substantially limits' qualification to the definition 
of disability." 119 
In addition, the majority found that no ambiguity existed within the MHRA 
definition of disability. 120 Asserting that "[i]f, and only if, a statute is ambiguous do 
we look to extrinsic sources like agency interpretation or legislative history to assist 
in interpreting ambiguous terms," 121 the court held that "[a]n agency cannot, by 
regulation, create an ambiguity in interpretation of a statute that does not otherwise 
exist." 122 Furthermore, the majority rejected Wal-Mart's argument that the words 
"substantial disability" in that statute applied to the entire definition, instead finding 
that a plain reading of the statute revealed ''three categories of covered 
112. Id. at 18. 
113. Id. at 21. 
114. Id. at 23. 
115. Id. 
116. Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37, ,r 33, 895 A.2d 309, 316. 
117. Id. ,r 15,895 A.2d at 313. 
I 18. Id. ,r 17,895 A.2d at 313. 
119. Id. ,r 21, 895 A.2d at 314. The court explained that because the Rozanski interpretation of the 
MHRA governed when the Legislature amended the definition of disability in 1991, failure to amend the 
statute at that time to include the restrictive "substantially limits" language could not result in acquiescence 
of the agency regulation. Id. 
120. Id. ,r 26, 895 A.2d at 3 I 5. 
121. Id. ,i22, 895 A.2d at315 (citing Competitive EnergyServs., LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2003 ME 
12, ,r15, 818 A.2d 1039, 1046). 
122. Id. ,r 23, 895 A.2d at 3 I 5. 
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conditions." 123 Recognizing that "it is possible for an individual to have a condition 
that meets all three categories," the majority clarified that, under its holding in 
Rozanski, "meeting all of them is not a prerequisite for coverage." 124 
Three justices in two dissents attacked the majority holding that the statutory 
definition of"disability" was unambiguous. 125 First, Justice Clifford endorsed Wal-
Mart's reading of the definition, stating that "[i]fthat language of the statute describing 
'substantial disability' is not part of the required definition of physical disability, then 
the 'substantial disability' phrase of the statute is rendered without meaning." 126 Given 
this ambiguity within the definition, Justice Clifford asserted that the court must look 
beyond its plain language, beginning with the Commission's regulation. 127 In doing so, 
he stated that the court must review the agency's interpretation for reasonableness, and 
uphold it "unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result." 128 Justice Clifford 
asserted that the interpretation was reasonable, particularly in light of the broad reading 
given the statute by the majority, which "renders [it] virtually unlimited in scope, and 
makes it applicable to even the most minor of disabilities." 129 He found it unlikely that 
the Legislature "intended that the statute make our courts accessible on the grounds of 
disability discrimination when alleged ailments are so very minor or trivial." 130 
Accepting Wal-Mart's theory oflegislative acquiescence, Justice Clifford found that 
"it is more likely that the Legislature recognized that [the regulation] ... contained 
clear substantial limitation language and that there was no need to incorporate the same 
language into [the MHRA] itself." 131 
Justice Levy, in a separate dissent, remarked that the statute was far from "a model 
of legislative clarity." 132 He was particularly concerned with the categorical 
interpretation given the definition by the majority, stating that "[t]here is no historical 
123. Id. ,r 24, 895 A.2d at 3 I 5. The court elaborated: 
Under the first category, a person is covered if he or she has "any disability, infirmity, 
malformation, disfigurement, congenital defect or mental condition caused by bodily injury, 
accident, disease, birth defect, environmental conditions or illness." The second category 
is "the physical or mental condition of a person that constitutes a substantial disability as 
determined by a physician, or in the case of a mental disability, by a psychiatrist or 
psychologist .... " The third category is "any other health or sensory impairment that 
requires special education, vocational rehabilitation or related services." 
Id. ( citations omitted). 
124. Id. ,r 25,895 A.2d at 315. 
125. Justice Clifford wrote one dissent, joined by Chief Justice Saufley and Justice Levy. id. ,r,r 34-35, 
895 A.2d at 316-18. Justice Levy wrote a second dissent, joined by Chief Justice Saufley. Id. ,r,r 46-49, 
895 A.2d at 318-19. 
126. Id. ,r 36, 895 A.2d at 317 (Clifford, J ., dissenting). 
127. Id.if37,895A.2dat317. 
128. Id. ,r 40,895 A.2dat317 (citingCompetitiveEnergyServs., LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2003 ME 
12, ,r 15,818 A.2d 1039, 1046). 
129. Id. ,r 42,895 A.2d at 318. 
130. Id. 
13 I. Id. ,r 43, 895 A.2d at 318. 
132. Id. ,r 46,895 A.2d at 318-19 (Levy, J., dissenting). Justice Levy further describes the definition 
as "a single, seventy-seven word run-on sentence that contains thirteen commas and employs the disjunctive 
'or' eight times." Id. 
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evidence that the Legislature intended to create not one but three separate definitions 
for the term 'physical or mental disability. "' 133 
IV. CRITIQUE AND CONSEQUENCES OF WHITNEY 
As the dissents in Whitney noted, the majority erred when it failed to recognize the 
ambiguity within the MHRA definition of"physical or mental disability." Indeed, the 
categorical reading given the statute by the court further highlighted rather than 
alleviated this ambiguity. In attempting to ascertain the "plain meaning" of the 
definition, the court found separate applicable categories of disabilities protected under 
the statute, each of seemingly distinct levels of severity. The first such category, "any 
disability, infirmity, malformation, disfigurement, congenital defect or mental 
condition caused by bodily injury, accident, disease, birth defect, environmental 
conditions or illness," when read literally, is a broad and expansive description that 
could arguably apply to most individuals at some point. 134 The second category, 
specifically "the physical or mental condition of a person that constitutes a substantial 
disability," as determined by a medical professional, imposes a much more stringent 
standard that almost certainly applies to a much more finite group and would 
automatically warrant inclusion within the first category. Such a reading renders the 
requirement of substantiality, a separate category according to the Whitney majority, 
completely superfluous. 135 Courts have been loath to interpret statutes as containing 
such extraneous language. 136 
Furthermore, a reading into the definition of distinct categories of disability would 
seem to promote inconsistency in the application of the Act. Thus, as Wal-Mart 
argued, a plaintiff who has sought a determination of his or her condition by a 
physician would need to meet the requirement of substantiality while others simply 
would need to show "any disability, infirmity, malformation disfigurement, congenital 
defect or mental condition." 137 Thus it would not be inconceivable, under the 
majority's reading, that two plaintiffs with identical conditions would encounter 
different results at the summary judgment stage simply because one sought a 
133. Id. ,r 48,895 A.2d at 319. 
134. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Maine State Chamber of Commerce et al. at 10, Whitney v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37,895 A.2d 309 (No. Fed. 05-172) ("[W]ithout any threshold requirement of 
substantiality, this definition would include every member of the general population at one time or another, 
and many only slightly impacted individuals for their lifetimes."). 
135. Magistrate Judge Kravchuk, in recommending summary judgment be granted to Wal-Mart, echoed 
this very concern, indicating that "the manner in which the Legislature used the language 'and includes' 
generates ambiguity as to whether the Legislature perhaps intended the MHRA to pertain only to 
individuals with a 'substantial disability"' and "if 'physical or mental disability' truly means any disability 
or infirmity without some limitation, then the 'and includes' clause is reduced to a redundancy." Whitney 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. 04-38-P-H, 2004 WL 2792297, at *8 n.5 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2004) 
( emphasis in original). 
136. See Frustaci v. CityofS. Portland, 2005 ME 101, ,r 12,879 A.2d 1001, 1006 ("In the construction 
of a statute, nothing should be treated as surplusage, if a reasonable interpretation supplying meaning and 
force is possible.")(quoting Finks v. Me. State Highway Comm'n, 328 A.2d 791, 799 (Me. 1974)); Home 
Builders Ass'n of Me., Inc., v. Town of Eliot, 2000 ME 82, ,r 8, 750 A.2d 566, 570 ("Surplusage occurs 
when a construction of one provision of a statute renders another provision unnecessary or without meaning 
or force."). 
I 3 7. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text. 
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physician's diagnosis while the other had not. Protection under the statute should not 
turn on one's choice to pursue or forgo the opinion of a medical professional. An 
overall requirement of substantiality throughout the statutory definition eliminates such 
an inconsistency and results in an even-handed application of the statute. 
Based on this apparent inconsistency within the statutory text, it is at least a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute that the Legislature intended the requirement 
of substantiality to apply to the entire statute. State and federal courts, 138 as well as 
commentators, 139 have interpreted and analyzed the MHRA as requiring a showing of 
substantial limitation. These interpretations suggest that the language of the statute is, 
at the very least, "reasonably susceptible to different interpretations," thus meeting the 
Law Court's own definition of ambiguity. 140 
The Whitney majority, in declaring the statute clear and unambiguous and 
determining that the Legislature envisioned three distinct categories within the 
definition, not only failed to recognize the ambiguity within the MHRA, but in doing 
so neglected to grant the appropriate deference to the Maine Human Rights 
Commission as the agency authorized by statue to implement it. The Legislature 
authorized the Commission to "adopt, amend and rescind rules to effectuate" the 
MHRA. 141 Pursuant to this authority, the agency addressed the ambiguity within the 
definition by placing a meaningful limitation on the types of medical conditions 
protected under the statute. In borrowing the federal standard for disability, the 
Commission clarified that the MHRA was not intended to apply to insignificant or 
temporary ailments but rather was meant to deter unfair treatment of a class that had 
traditionally been discriminated against and would truly benefit from statutory 
protection. 142 Such an implementation meets the "reasonableness" standard utilized by 
Maine courts when reviewing an interpretation of a statute by an agency, like the 
Commission, that is authorized to administer it. 143 
The reasonableness of the regulation defining "physical or mental disability'' 
becomes more apparent when considered in light of the entire range of powers bestowed 
upon the Commission by the Legislature. In addition to rulemaking authority, the agency 
138. See id. For additional state and federal cases, see cases cited supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
139. See, e.g., Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597,626 n.205 (2004) (describing the MHRA definition as including 
a requirement that a disability must be substantial); Richard A. West, No Plaintiff Left Behind: Liability 
for Workplace Discrimination and Retaliation in New Jersey, 28 SETON HALLLEGIS. J. 127, 132-33 (2003) 
(noting substantiality requirement in MHRA). 
140. Competitive Energy Servs. v. Pub. Utils. Comrn'n, 2003 ME 12, ,i 15, 818 A.2d 1039, 1046 
(quoting Portland Valve, Inc. v. Rockwood Sys. Corp., 460 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Me. 1983)); cf Lisa 
Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing Around the EEOC's "Disability" 
Regulations Under the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST 1. REV. 177, 196 (2004) (arguing that the ambiguity of the 
ADA's definition of "disability'' is apparent from the varying conclusions that different courts and even 
Supreme Court Justices have reached regarding its scope). 
141. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4566(7) (West 2005). 
142. While the legislative history of the MHRA is sparse, an original drafting of the statutory definition 
of"physical or mental disability'' contained a list of conditions included within its scope, including epilepsy 
seizure disorders, paralysis, cerebral palsy, autism, and mental retardation. See supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. Such expressly included conditions arguably suggest that the Legislature was 
contemplating only substantial or seriously debilitating ailments when drafting the definition. See also 
supra Part II.B (discussing the Commission's rationale behind the regulation). 
143. See supra note 74-75 and accompanying text. 
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has a general mandate to "investigat[e] all forms of invidious discrimination." 144 Once 
an individual has approached the Commission with a complaint of discrimination, 145 the 
agency must, after preliminary settlement efforts, 146 conduct "such preliminary 
investigation as it deems necessary to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that unlawful discrimination has occurred." 147 If reasonable grounds exist, the 
Commission can elect to bring a suit against the employer. 148 
Because proof of membership in a protected class is a threshold matter for any 
plaintiff claiming discrimination under the MHRA, 149 interpretation of the statutory 
definition of disability is absolutely necessary before any reasonable grounds 
determination can be made. It is thus reasonable to expect that the Commission, 
pursuant to the rule-making power granted it by the Legislature, would interpret the 
statute in a way that clearly defined the scope of protections offered by the MHRA. 
In pursuit of that end, rather than adopting a novel and untested standard for disability, 
the agency implemented a definition that, at the time, had been incorporated into 
federal law for over ten years. 150 
Rather than recognizing the reasonableness and utility of the Commission's 
regulation, the Whitney majority rendered it invalid and put forth its own interpretation 
of the statute. The court concluded that the Legislature included three distinct 
definitions of"physical or mental disability" within the MHRA, seemingly without any 
textual or historical support. 151 In so doing, the court ignored its own well-established 
and well-practiced canons of statutory interpretation and administrative deference. 
Id. 
144. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4566 (West 2005). 
145. See id. § 461 I. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that: 
Any person who believes that the person has been subject to unlawful discrimination, or any 
employee of the commission, may file a complaint under oath with the commission stating 
the facts concerning the alleged discrimination, provided that such complaints must be filed 
with the commission not more than 6 months after the alleged act of unlawful 
discrimination. 
146. As an initial step, the Commission must "provide an opportunity for the complainant and 
respondent to resolve the matter by settlement agreement." Id.§ 4612(l)(A). 
147. Id. § 4612(1)(8). 
148. Id. § 4612(4)(A). An individual can bring suit in Superior Court regardless of the Commission's 
findings. Id. § 4621. There is no requirement within the statute that an individual must file a grievance 
with the Commission before bringing suit, although not doing so typically results in a forfeit of attorney's 
fees and civil penal or compensatory and punitive damages. Id. § 4622. 
149. See discussion supra Part Il.B. 
150. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
I 51. Justice Levy, in dissent, stated that: 
The Court interprets this challenging statute categorically, finding within it three separate 
definitions of"physical or mental disability." It does so in the face of a sentence that does 
not contain any textual signals, such as numbers, letters, parentheses, semi-colons or other 
punctuation[] that one might expect to find when a legislative body seeks to establish, in one 
sentence, three separate definitions for a single term. 
Whitneyv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 ME 37, ,I 47,895 A.2d 309,319 (Levy, J., dissenting). The dissent 
goes on to note that "[t]he interpretive history recounted by the Court sheds more fog than light on its 
subject, except, perhaps, in one respect: There is no historical evidence that the Legislature intended to 
create not one but three separate definitions for the term 'physical or mental disability."' Id. ,r 48, 895 A.2d 
at 319. 
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The impact of this error is substantial. By declaring the regulation void, the court 
left a complete dearth of administrative guidance for employers, employees, 
practitioners, and courts alike regarding what conditions constitute a disability under 
Maine law. In addition, the Whitney decision effectively invalidated years of common 
law precedent in which both the state and federal courts had interpreted the MHRA 
coextensively with federal law.152 In reaching its decision, the majority ignored the 
vast weight of authority, including its own opinion in Winston, which recognized the 
validity of looking beyond the MHRA to both federal law and the Commission's 
regulations for assistance in interpreting the scope of the statute. Against this 
overwhelming precedent, the court offered only its decision in Rozanski, an opinion 
that did not directly consider a requirement of substantiality under the MHRA.153 
To compound this error, the majority offered no insight into what possible 
limitations, if any, may fairly be read into the statute. By heralding the plain meaning 
of the statute while at the same time rendering federal law, common law precedent, and 
regulatory guidance inapplicable to its interpretation, the court left Maine with a 
definition of disability that is virtually unlimited in scope. In the final analysis, 
Whitney transformed the MHRA from a statute directed at disadvantaged minorities 
to one that arguably protects a majority of employees in the state of Maine. Such a 
result presents a potentially unbearable burden on employers. 154 In addressing these 
concerns, Justice Alexander, writing for the majority, stated that "legislative policy 
arguments are more appropriately left to the executive and the Legislature to resolve," 
and that "[i]f a legislative policy concern is valid, the appropriate body to address that 
concern is the Maine Legislature, it is not to seek amendment of the law by judicial 
action." 155 
In light of both the lack of guidance and overly broad scope of the MRHA 
resulting from the Whitney decision, the Maine Legislature should accept this invitation 
by the Law Court and amend the statutory language of the MHRA to provide a clear 
and unambiguous definition of"physical or mental disability." Indeed, because the 
Whitney majority held that the statute was unambiguous on its face, any subsequent 
interpretations of the MHRA by the Commission that do not fully comport with that 
broad reading will almost certainly be subject to invalidation. 156 As a result, legislative 
action seems to be the only viable alternative left in the wake of the Whitney decision. 
V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Legislators have several options to consider in revising the MHRA. First, the 
Legislature could simply adopt the federal standard as incorporated in both the ADA 
and the Rehabilitation Act, essentially codifying the Commission's initial regulatory 
152. See cases cited supra note 67. 
153. Whitney, 2006 ME 37, ,i 36, 895 A.2d at 317 n.3 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (noting that "[o]ur 
decision in Rozanski never considered or addressed either of the issues presented to us by the federal court, 
and therefore did not 'necessarily reject the 'substantially limits' qualification to the definition of 
disability,' as the Court states."). See discussion Part !J.C. 
154. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Maine State Chamber of Commerce et al, supra note 134, at 24-28. 
155. Whitney, 2006 ME 37,127, 895 A.2d at 315-16. 
156. The Commission has adopted changes to its regulatory definition of"physical or mental disability" 
in light of Whitney. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. 
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requirement of a substantial limitation on a major life activity. 157 Such a result would 
harmonize the amended definition with the overwhelming common law precedent that 
has interpreted the MHRA in lockstep with the federal statutes. 158 Additionally, that 
solution would promote continuity for Maine's employers who have relied on such 
precedent as well as the Commission's regulations in formulating appropriate work-
place policies relating to discrimination. Finally, the inclusion of the "substantially 
limits" requirement would bring Maine into alignment with a large majority of other 
jurisdictions that have chosen to do the same. 159 However, criticism has abounded in 
157. As of this writing, the Maine Legislature is considering, in response to the Whitney decision, a bill 
that would repeal the existing definition of "physical or mental disability" and amend it to include a 
physical or mental impairment that "substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities," 
"significantly impairs physical or mental health," or "requires special education, vocational rehabilitation, 
or related services." Comm. Amendment B to L.D. 1027 (123rd Legis. 2007). The new definition would 
also included certain conditions regardless of severity, including absent, artificial, or replacement limbs, 
alcoholism, bipolar disorder; blindness, cancer, Crohn's disease, cystic fibrosis, deafness, diabetes, 
substantial disfigurement, epilepsy, heart disease, HIV or AIDS, major depressive disorder, mental 
retardation, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, paralysis. Parkinson's disease, and schizophrenia. Id. 
In addition, certain conditions are expressly excluded from the scope of the statute, including pedophilia, 
sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and tobacco smoking. Id. 
The Whitney decision has also sparked a heated exchange among members of the Maine 
employment law bar. See Katy Rand, Employment at Will in Maine: R.l.P.?, 22 Me. B.J. 12 (2007); David 
G. Webbert, In Defense of Whitney, 22 Me. B.J. 104 (2007); Katy Rand, In Definse of 'R.l.P. ', 22 Me. B.J. 
108 (2007); David Webbert, Final Thoughts, 22 Me. B.J. 111 (2007). 
158. See cases cited supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
159. Currently, thirty-nine jurisdictions have incorporated some form of the federal requirement of a 
substantial limitation on a major life activity within their employment discrimination laws: Alaska (ALASKA 
STAT.§ 18.80.300(12)(West, Westlawthrough 2005 legislation)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41-
1462(2) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second Regular Session)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-
102(3) (West, Westlaw through 2006 First Extraordinary Session )); Colorado ( COLO. REV. ST AT. ANN. § 
24-34-301(2.5)(a) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2006 First Extraordinary Session)); Delaware 
(DEL. CODE ANN. tit.19, § 722(4)(West, Westlaw through 75 Laws 2006, ch. 441)); District of Columbia 
(D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02(5A) (West, Westlaw through September 2006)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 
4 I 3.08(1}(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second Regular Session)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-
2(3) (West, Westlaw through end of the 2006 Regular Session)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 3 78-1) (West, 
WestlawthroughApril2006)); Idaho (IDAHOCODEANN. § 67-5902(15)(West, Westlawthrough 2006 First 
Extraordinary Session)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-l-3(r) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second 
Regular Session)); Kansas(KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 44-1002(j)(West, Westlawthrough2005 Regular Session)}; 
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 344.010(4) (West, Westlaw through end of2006 Regular Session and 
First Extraordinary Session)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2253(1) (West, Westlaw through all 
2006 First Extraordinary and Regular Session Acts )); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LA ws ch. 151 B, § I ( 17) 
(West, Westlawthrough 2006 Second Regular Session)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LA ws § 37 .1103(d)(i)(A) 
(West, Westlawthrough P.A. 2006, No. 1-442)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.§ 363A.03(12) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 Regular Session)); Missouri (Mo. REv. STAT.§ 213.010(4) (West, Westlaw through 2006 
Second Regular Session)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101 ( I 9}(a) (West, Westlaw through 2005 
Regular Session)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(9)(West, Westlaw through 2006 Second Regular 
Session)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. 613.310(1) (West, Westlaw through 2005 73rd Regular Session and 
the 22nd Special Session)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 354-A:2(IV) (West, Westlaw through 
end of2006 Regular Session)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28- l-2(M) (West, Westlaw through 2006 
Second Regular Session)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 168A-3(7a) (West, Westlaw through end of 
2006 Regular Session)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-02.4-02(5) (West, Westlaw through 2005 
Regular Session)); Ohio(OHIOREV.CODEANN. § 4112.01(13)(West, Westlawthrough2006)); Oklahoma 
(OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1301(4) (West, Westlaw through end of2006 Second Extraordinary Session)); 
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recent years regarding the federal standard as overly restrictive, particularly in light of 
federal decisions that have significantly reduced the class of protected persons. 160 
In light of this criticism, another option for the Legislature is to consider the 
approaches of other states that deviate from the federal definition. Of the states that 
do not include a "substantiality" requirement within their anti-discrimination laws, a 
small minority have disability definitions that do not require any limitation on a major 
life activity, 161 a solution that seemingly would place Maine precisely where Whitney 
has left it. California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), 162 on the other 
hand, has adjusted the federal standard while still maintaining the requirement of some 
degree oflimitation. Specifically, the FEHA contains definitions for both mental and 
physical disabilities indicating that conditions must only "limit" rather than 
"substantially limit" a major life activity. 163 A 2001 amendment to the law clarified 
that "[t]his distinction is intended to result in broader coverage under the law of this 
state than under that federal act. " 164 A condition "limits" a major life activity under the 
statute if it "makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult." 165 The 
California statute goes on to expressly exclude certain conditions that would not meet 
the definition of mental or physical disability, including "sexual behavior disorders, 
compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use 
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.I00(l)(a) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 Regular Session)); 
Pennsylvania (43 PA. CONS. STAT.ANN.§ 954(p.1) (West, Westlawthrough 2006 Regular Session)); Rhode 
Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 42-87-1 (West, Westlaw through 2005 January Session)); South Carolina (S.C. 
CODE ANN.§ 1-13-30(0) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 Regular Session)); South Dakota (S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS§ 20-13-1(4) (West, Westlaw through end of2006 Regular Session)); Tennessee (TENN. 
CODE. ANN. § 4-21-102(9)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2006 First Extraordinary Session and Second 
Regular Session)); Texas (TEX. LAB. ANN. § 21.002(6) (West, Westlaw through end of 2006 Third Called 
Session)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-102(5) (West, Westlaw through end of 2006 legislation)); 
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(5) (West, Westlaw through 2005 First Session)); Virginia (VA. 
CODE ANN.§ 51.5-3 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2006 Special Session!)); West Virginia (W. VA. 
CODE § 5-11-3(m) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Second Extraordinary Session)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. 
§ 111.32(8) (West, Westlaw through 2005)). 
160. See, e.g., Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining "Disability" Discrimination: A 
Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections For All Workers, 14 STAN. L. &POL'YREV. 321,322 (2003) 
("In the years since the ADA 's enactment, the federal courts have chipped away at the law's protected class 
by adopting overly narrow rules for the analysis of who meets the statutory definition of 'disability."'); 
Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination Claims in the Federal 
Courts, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 303 (2005) ("Many commentators have lamented 
the law as ineffectual and ... have been especially dismayed about the U.S. Supreme Court's narrowing 
of the law's protection."). 
161. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46a-51(15) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Regular Session) 
( defining physical disability as "any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital 
or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to, 
epilepsy, deafness or hearing impairment or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or 
device"); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 292(21) (West, Westlaw through L.2006, chapter 742) (defining disability 
as "a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or 
neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by 
medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques"). 
162. CAL. Gov'T CODE§§ 12900-12996 (West 2007). 
163. See CAL. Gov'TCODE § 12926(i)(I), (k)(I)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Regular Session). 
164. CAL. Gov'T CODE § I 2926.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Regular Session). 
165. CAL. Gov'TCODE § 12926(i)(l)(B), (k)(l)(B)(ii)(West, Westlawthrough 2006 Regular Session). 
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disorders resulting from the current unlawful use of controlled substances or other 
drugs."166 
The FEHA model is attractive because it maintains a limitation on a major life 
activity that prevents an overly broad application of the statute without requiring a 
showing of "substantiality." Furthermore, by expressly excluding specific conditions, 
it provides some certainty and prohibits frivolous claims without the need for judicial 
interpretation in certain specifically defined circumstances, such as the instructor's 
claim in Winston. A potential disadvantage of the FEHA model, however, is that for 
many other circumstances, like the one that arose in Whitney, the statute is not entirely 
clear. Does a heart condition that limits work hours to forty-five hours a week "limit" 
rather than "substantially limit" a major life activity? Such a scheme would seem to 
invite uncertainty and much contested litigation. 
A third option for legislative consideration lies closer to home. In response to the 
Whitney decision, the Maine Human Rights Commission has adopted changes to the 
regulatory definition of"physical or mental disability." 167 These regulations initially 
define "physical or mental disability" according to the three-part definition described 
by the Whitney majority, essentially breaking down the exact language of the statute 
into three distinct categories. 168 The rule then goes on to give specific definitions of 
terms used in the opening phrase of the statutory definition: 
(a) "Disability" means a physiological or mental condition that limits one or 
more major life activities, including, but not limited to, functions such as caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 
learning, lifting, reproduction, eating, sleeping, driving, and working. The term 
"limits one or more major life activities" means makes achievement of a major life 
activity or activities difficult. 
(b) "Infirmity'' means a physiological disorder affecting one or more of the 
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, 
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-
urinary, heroic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. 
(c) "Malformation" means a defective or abnormal bodily formation affecting 
one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special 
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, 
digestive, genito-urinary, heroic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. 
(d) "Disfigurement" means an externally visible malformation. 
(e) "Congenital defect" means a bodily defect present at birth affecting one or 
more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense 
organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, 
genito-urinary, heroic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. 
166. See CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12926(i)(5), (k)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Regular Session). 
167. Me. Human Rights Comm'n, 94-348 Proposed Changes to Rules, http://www.maine.gov/mhrc/ 
laws/Proposed%20Rule%20(revised).pdf. As of this writing, these rules had been adopted but were still 
awaiting review by the Office of the Attorney General. See Maine Human Rights Commission, Laws & 
Regulations, Proposed/Adopted Changes, http://www.maine.gov/mhrc/laws/changes.html. 
168. Id. at I. 
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(t) "Mental condition" means any mental or psychological disorder, including, 
but not limited to, mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental 
illness, and specific learning disabilities.169 
In addition, the regulations contain a list of exceptions that are expressly not included 
within the definition, including "[ c ]onditions that are ordinarily experienced by the 
average person in the general population or are both transitory and minor," such as 
"minor cuts or bruises, the common cold, typical flu, upset stomach or ordinary 
headaches." 170 
These regulations seem to attempt to satisfy the holding of Whitney while 
addressing a concern that the court's broad reading of the statute would cover trivial 
conditions. In so doing, they incorporate several aspects of California's FEHA model, 
including the elimination of a substantiality requirement, the definition of"limits one 
or more major life activities" and the express exclusion of specific conditions. 
Accordingly, the language of the regulations is subject to the same vagueness concerns 
that accompany the California approach. Specifically, how are courts or employers to 
make an accurate determination of when a condition "makes achievement ofa major 
life activity" difficult, or what conditions, beyond those specifically mentioned, are 
beyond the reach of statutory protection because they are "experienced by the average 
person"? 
Despite these deficiencies, the amended regulations provide a viable "middle 
ground" between the limitations imposed by a substantiality requirement and the all-
encompassing reading of the definition of disability offered by the Whitney majority. 
They represent an improvement over the current interpretation of the MHRA left in the 
wake of Whitney by providing greater clarity and setting more definitive standards by 
which to determine the scope of protection offered by the statute. The Legislature 
should consider a definition similar to that currently proposed by the Commission as 
a viable alternative to the present disability definition under the MHRA. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Law Court failed to recognize an inherent 
ambiguity within the MHRA. Along the way, the court rejected years of precedent and 
invalidated an agency regulation that had been promulgated and relied on by Maine 
courts for over twenty years. In holding that the definition of disability under the 
MHRA was clear and unambiguous, the court effectively left employees, employers, 
practitioners, and courts without any common law or administrative guidance as to 
what exactly constitutes a protected disability in Maine. The Legislature should 
respond to the Whitney decision by amending the statutory definition of disability 
under the MHRA. An unambiguous definition would provide much needed clarity to 
all parties involved and prevent an overly broad application of anti-discrimination 
protection under state law in Maine. 
169. Id. at 1-2. 
170. Id. at 2. The proposed rules also expressly exclude ''transvestism, transsexualism, pedophelia; 
exhibitionism; voyeurism; gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments; sexual 
behavior disorders; compulsive gambling; kleptomania; pyromania; or ... psychoactive substance abuse 
disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs." Id. at 3. 
